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1. Overview of Fiscal Decentralization
in South Africa
Roy Bahl and Paul Smoke
INTRODUCTION
South Africa has undergone major changes in its local government
system since the demise of apartheid in 1993. The 1996 Constitution
and subsequent legislation have dramatically redefined the public
sector, mandating the development of a separate sphere of democratic
local governments (municipalities) empowered to provide a wide
variety of public services. The definition and implementation of
anticipated new local government functions and revenues and the
supporting development of democratic decision-making and managerial
capacity, however, are emerging more slowly than expected in the
complex political, institutional, and fiscal environment that prevails.
Some difficult choices and challenges remain in laying a foundation for
local governments to meet the substantial role given to them in the
Constitution.
South Africa is a case that many governments and students of fiscal
decentralization are following closely because there have been a
number of noteworthy successes in normally problematic areas of
reform. First, many elements of a solid constitutional and legal
framework for decentralization are already in place. Developing such a
framework is a major challenge in many developing countries. Second,
the restructuring of the intergovernmental system set up direct relations
between the national government and the municipalities, greatly
reducing hierarchical arrangements through the provinces. Many
countries
struggle
with
how to appropriately
structure
intergovernmental relations in multi-level systems, and developing an
appropriate degree of local autonomy from the intermediate tier is often
particularly difficult. Third, the South African government recently
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constituted a boundary commission, the Municipal Demarcation Board,
which eliminated about two-thirds of all municipal governments.
Developing countries often struggle to deal with the politically
challenging problem of having many small local governments that are
unlikely to be viable and effective. Fourth, many key elements of a
local government revenue system are already in place. South African
municipalities have some productive local revenue sources, a system of
recurrent intergovernmental transfers that has had a positive re
distributional effect, a newly defined mechanism for monitoring
municipal fiscal condition, and a municipal borrowing framework that
is in an advanced stage of development.
Despite this impressive progress, some great challenges remain.
There is a lack of clarity in the definition of local service assignments
outside of the large metropolitan areas. In many cases, service delivery
arrangements are also needed at the settlement level below the formal
municipal government structure, especially now that the recent
demarcation has created larger jurisdictions that are more 'distant' from
their constituents. Municipal revenue generation is uneven and often
inadequate, especially outside the urban centers, and there are some
major design and administration problems with a number of the most
important local revenue sources. The system of intergovernmental
transfers also requires further significant development. There are
indications that the share of national recurrent resources going to
municipalities may not be commensurate with the responsibilities they
have been assigned, the principal recurrent transfer formula measures
fiscal need relatively crudely, and the system of conditional capital
transfers is complex and fragmented. Another major issue is that even
after the recent local government consolidation, fiscal and
administrative capacity and needs vary greatly across the new
municipalities. Far more attention has been given to defining the
elements of the fiscal system than to developing a fiscal
decentralization implementation strategy that takes account of such
inter-jurisdictional differences.
As in many developing countries, fiscal decentralization is in
process in South Africa, so that there is still an opportunity for the
government to make critical decisions that would greatly influence the
eventual form and performance of the local government system. The
research reported in this volume focuses on how to deal with these
outstanding challenges. This discussion and evaluation also should have
considerable relevance beyond South Africa.
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The Approach1
In considering the South African case, we focus on the typical elements
of fiscal decentralization analysis - expenditure assignment, revenue
assignment, and intergovernmental transfers - and use standard
analytical criteria and techniques. 2 The approach taken to this work,
however, has three features that distinguish it from most other studies
on this subject.
First, policy advice on fiscal decentralization in developing
countries is typically normative and very limited by the weak data base
on which analysis must be built. Our research is normatively driven and
is also limited by data availability. However, we conducted detailed
quantitative and qualitative analysis of South African data, and we
developed new data sets specifically for this work. This has enriched
the analysis markedly. We also consider and empirically document the
likely implications of a range of options for local government fiscal
system design rather than rigidly define a particular normatively 'ideal'
solution for South Africa.
Second, much of the empirical work on fiscal decentralization
provides a broad-brush overview of the entire intergovernmental fiscal
system or more detailed treatment of one particular aspect of the system
in a specific case. We use an approach that examines in detail several
key elements of fiscal decentralization in South Africa, but we also
demonstrate the important linkages among them, such as the
correspondence between the expenditure and the revenue sides of the
budget and the inter-relationships among key elements of the revenue
structure. Also considered is the relationship among the fiscal, political,
and institutional aspects of decentralization.
Third, much of the international work on fiscal decentralization
focuses primarily on the design of reforms. We focus not only on
design, but also on the challenges of developing an implementation
strategy.3 This analysis heavily emphasizes the theme that the
decentralization program should recognize the different characteristics
and capacities of the local governments in the system. As is typical in
developing countries, much needs to be done to get the local
government finance system in order, and it cannot be accomplished all
at once or in exactly the same manner in all local governments. We
give significant attention to strategic issues, such as how to sequence
reforms in a way that does not too rapidly give too many
responsibilities and resources to all local governments, potentially
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overwhelming their ability to perform and/or straining the tolerance of
the central agencies that lose functions and resources through
devolution.
Although the analysis in this volume focuses on the South African
experience, it also draws from the international experience. This
approach should provide guidance for analysts working on other
countries facing similar fiscal decentralization policy challenges.
The Context of Reform in South Africa

,,

i

I

I

i

I

!
I

Even prior to the election of Nelson Mandela as president in 1994 and
the subsequent dismantling of apartheid, the Republic of South Africa
had begun to restructure its public sector. This restructuring has
intensified in recent years, with a focus on creating a more
decentralized and democratic system of govemment.4 In undertaking
reform, the country faces the special challenge of redressing enormous
disparities in service levels among jurisdictions that had long been
subject to strict racial segregation.
Provincial governments were originally given a strong role by the
Constitution that created the Union of South Africa in 1910. The 1986
Provincial Government Act, however, abolished provincial legislatures
and replaced them with appointed executive authorities. New powers,
such as responsibility for delivering health services, were subsequently
given to provincial administrations, but provincial budgets still required
ratification by the national Parliament. The 1996 Constitution
empowers provincial legislatures, more clearly defines the role of
provincial governments, and allows them some degree of autonomy.
On the local government side, which is the focus of this volume,
non-white areas were managed during much of the apartheid era by
local bodies that had had few powers and resources. This continued to
be the case even after they were elected in later periods. The Black
Local Authorities (BLAs) were established in 1982 but never enjoyed
political legitimacy. They were commonly seen as a desperate attempt
by the regime to provide a fa9ade of local democracy for blacks, while
essentially reinforcing segregation and keeping apartheid intact. BLAs
were never able to develop productive tax bases, largely because of
apartheid restrictions on economic development in the black areas.
Service levels typically lagged far behind those in the White Local
Authorities (WLAs). Poor service levels and attempts to impose rents
and service charges in the BLAs angered local communities and led to
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the infamous rent boycotts, fueling the drive by civic organizations and
activists to topple apartheid.
In the late 1980s, the national government tried to defuse escalating
tensions and to salvage the government system. It established a
substantial intergovernmental grants program to channel infrastructure
resources to poor black areas through umbrella institutions called
Regional Service Councils (RSCs) and Joint Service Boards (JSBs). In
the end, these late interventions were ineffective, and the situation
continued to worsen.
In response to the severity of the crisis, a Local Government
Negotiating Forum was established in I 990 t<;> develop a new local
government system that would be more widely accepted. This resulted
in the passage ofthe Local Government Transition Act of I 993, which
provided for a three-stage process oftransition. During the pre-interim
phase, local forums were established to negotiate the appointment of
temporary councils that would govern until local elections were held.
Municipal elections marked the start ofthe interim phase, which ended
with the definition ofa new local government system described below.
South Africa's current unitary system of governance includes
national, provincial, and local governments. The two types of sub
national government are not hierarchical, but separate 'spheres', each
with direct responsibility to the national government. During the initial
transitional period, two-tier local governments were established in large
urban and rural areas, with the primary tier composed ofunits closest to
the people and the secondary tier being larger umbrella units. Thus
Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs) were established as
secondary tier governments in six of the largest urban areas, and a
number of smaller primary tier Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs)
operated within each ofthem.5 Single-tier Transitional Local Councils
(TLCs) governed non-metropolitan urban areas, but many were at least
partially dependent for infrastructure funding on broader-area District
Councils (DCs), or in KwaZulu-Natal the Regional Councils (RCs),
which evolved from the old RSCs and JSBs established during the
apartheid era. Transitional Rural Councils (TRCs) were established as
the primary tier in rural areas, but most relied on the secondary-tier
District Councils (DCs) for various services and assistance. 6
As discussed more fully in Chapter 2, the 1996 Constitution and the
Local Government Municipal Structures Act (1998) consolidated a
complex system ofurban and rural transitional governments into three
municipal categories, abolishing the two-tier structures in metropolitan
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areas.7 Metropolitan municipalities (category A, or 'metros')
exclusively cover large urban areas. Local municipalities (category B),
which were created primarily from the TLCs and TRCs, cover non
metropolitan localities, which vary in size and degree of urbanization.
District municipalities (category C) geographically encompass several
B municipalities and coordinate integrated development planning for
the entire district. The districts also provide services on behalf of less
capacitated B municipalities situated within their borders, particularly
in more rural areas. A Board constituted under the Local Government
Municipal Demarcation Act (2000) designed a reorganization and
consolidation of local governments in South Africa, resulting in a
reduction in their number from 843 to 284, and created a system of
'wall-to-wall' municipalities. The total includes six metropolitan (A)
municipalities, 231 local (B) municipalities, and 47 district (C)
municipalities.8 In addition, there are 25 district management areas
(DMAs), which are special areas (essentially non-viable local
municipalities) under the jurisdiction of district municipalities. The
presentation in Table 1.1 summarizes this local government structure in
terms of the A, B, and C labels.
The Constitution gives higher levels of government appropriate
oversight and control powers over local governments. Assignment of
certain powers and revenues to local governments is at the discretion of
the center and, to an extent, the provinces. The center develops national
objectives and guidelines and ensures adequate coordination among all
levels of government. The center also designs and administers the
intergovernmental transfer system. Particularly important players are
the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) and the
National Treasury. Finally, the national and provincial levels of
government monitor municipal affairs - and can intervene as necessary
- to ensure that basic standards of good governance, service provision,
and financial discipline are being met.
Various major reforms are still in process. DPLG designed the
Local Government Municipal Systems Act (2000) to regulate internal
municipal arrangements, focusing on support of economic development
and establishment of participatory mechanisms. In addition, the Act
mandates reforms in human resource management and service delivery
arrangements. These reforms are being operationally defined and
implemented. Parliament is considering a new Local Government
Property Rates Bill that is intended to improve municipal property
taxation (see Chapter 4). The National Treasury is moving forward the
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Table 1.1 The structure oflocal government in South Africa
Type of
settlement

Type of
municipality

Category

Number

Urban
Urban and Rural
Rural

Metropolitan
Local
District

A
B
C

6
231
47

Source: Adapted/updated from Vaz (1999).

Local Government Municipal Finance Management Bill, which
includes provisions about municipal financial management systems,
municipal debt, and monitoring municipal fiscal condition. Based on
their successful provincial reforms, the National Treasury has taken
important concrete steps to improve the budgeting and financial
management system and capabilities ofmunicipalities.

SOUTH AFRICAN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION9
Provincial governments have responsibility for a wide range of
functions. Most important among them are elementary and secondary
education, health care, social welfare, and public transportation. The
Constitution allows provincial governments to impose taxes on any
base except personal and corporate income, general sales, value-added,
customs, and property. The provinces are given authority to levy a flat
rate surcharge on personal income subject to approval of the
Parliament, but this approval has not yet been granted. Provincial own
source revenue collections have to date been quite modest. Provincial
governments are also entitled to an 'equitable share' of national revenue
in the form ofa grant. There is a framework in which they are allowed
to borrow, but they have generally not done so except to provide
bridging finance.
Municipal governments in South Africa are given substantial powers
and functions by the Constitution. The most important municipal
services are water, sanitatio_n (including solid waste), roads, stormwater
drainage, and electricity. A few functions are assigned through
legislation. 10 The actual distribution ofresponsibilities, however, varies
widely within and across types of local governments. Some
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municipalities, particularly in larger urban areas, take responsibility for
a significant range of functions and services, while other local
governments, particularly but not exclusively in rural areas, provide
few services independently.
Local governments are granted a number of sources of revenue by
the Constitution, and they are also given the right to borrow, except to
finance a recurrent deficit. 11 The main sources of revenue are rates on
property and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of
the municipality. Other sources of revenue may be allowed by national
legislation, but local governments are specifically excluded from
imposing income tax, value-added tax, general sales tax, and customs
duties. The Constitution also entitles the local governments to an
'equitable share' of national revenues. 12 This is provided as an
unconditional transfer. Local governments may receive additional
grants from the national or provincial governments on either a
conditional or an unconditional basis.
Although responsibility for some basic services has been assigned to
both provincial and local governments, the local governments are
13
considerably smaller partners in the intergovernmental fiscal system.
They account for only about one-third of total sub-national government
spending, and they receive only about a 3 percent share of total national
government revenues. The provincial governments are financed
primarily by transfers from the center, with provincial own-source
revenues accounting for less than 5 percent of their total revenues. The
situation is quite different for the local governments, which raise, in the
aggregate, over 90 percent of their revenues from own-sources.
However, there is a wide variation among the local governments, from
the large metropolitan governments that raise nearly all of their
revenues to small, rural councils that have very little fiscal capacity and
depend heavily on national government transfers.
The drastic reduction in the number of local governments under the
December 2000 demarcation was designed to improve the efficiency of
local public service delivery, but it has raised some concern about
distancing constituents from their elected officials. The existence of
284 elected local councils in a country of 43 million people, however,
does bring government relatively 'close' to the population. Moreover,
because the local governments raise most of their revenues from own
sources, their elected leaders might be seen as more accountable to their
constituents than are officials of the provinces where most financing
comes from the center. Thus, local governments in South Africa come

9
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Table 1.2 Percent distribution of South African local government
revenues and expenditures:fiscal year1999-2000
Source

Revenues

Transfers
RSC levy
Utility fees
Property tax
Other

Percent
8.0
7.0
32.0*
21.0
32.0

Object

Expenditures

Salaries
General expenses
Bulk services
Maintenance
Capital
Other

Percent
31.0
14.0
30.0
8.0
13.0
4.0

Notes: • Amounts reported are gross of some expenditures for providing electricity
services.

Source: National Treasury (2001) Chapter 9.

much closer to fitting the concept of 'self-governance' than do the
provincial governments.
Good comparable data on local government finance are not easy to
come by in South Africa because of weak accounting, budgeting, and
reporting systems. This problem has been further compounded by the
recent boundary changes and municipal consolidations. However, from
various available government reports, we can piece together some basic
information on the structure of local government revenues and
expenditures in South Africa.
As can be seen from Table 1.2, the local government revenue
structure is dominated by utility fees, particularly the surplus revenue
derived from the electricity undertakings of municipal governments.
While these data are reported net of some bulk charges, many costs of
providing electricity services have not been removed. Therefore, the
reported figure overstates the total amount of resources available from
this local source of revenue for general budget financing.
The property tax and RSC levy, the latter a combination payroll and
turnover tax, together account for less than one-third of municipal
revenues. The property tax is available only to category A and B
municipalities, while the RSC levy is available only to category A and
C municipalities. Particularly in the case of the property tax, the local
governments have significant discretion in controlling the revenue

1,

IO

Restructuring Local Government Finance in Developing Countries

yield. South African local governments differ from those in most
developing countries in that the dependence on intergovernmental
transfers is relatively light, at least in the urban municipalities.
Ideally, we would report the level of expenditures by service
function in order to describe how local governments choose to allocate
their revenues among sectors. In fact, functional breakdowns of
spending for all local governments are not currently available in South
Africa. The disaggregation of expenditures by object, shown in Table
1.2, reveals that salaries and general operating expenditures account for
nearly two-thirds of the budget, excluding electricity bulk services
expenditure. A relatively small share is allocated to capital purposes,
but this 13 percent figure for South Africa is not atypical for developing
countries.

SOUTH AFRICAN FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Is the South African fiscal system more decentralized than that in other,
similar countries? International Monetary Fund data (IMF, 2001)
indicate that the share of sub-national government (provincial and
local) expenditures (in total government expenditures) in South Africa
averaged 48 percent during the period 1994-1999. 14 This is well above
the international average for developing countries of about 14.7 percent
during this period.
A straightforward comparison with the average for other developing
countries may be misleading. Such averages do not take into account
the very great differences among countries in size, income level,
diversity, and other factors that are thought to be associated with a
greater preference for fiscal decentralization. A better approach is to
make adjustments for those factors that one would expect to lead to a
higher degree of fiscal decentralization. Then, it would be possible to
argue whether South Africa's level of fiscal decentralization is higher
or lower than we should expect it to be based on broad international
patterns. To address this issue, we have estimated an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression of the relationship between the provincial
and local government share of total government expenditures (ES) in 93
countries (using averages for the period 1992-1997), and four
independent variables hypothesized to be associated with
decentralization:
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1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in US$ (Y). The
expectation is that higher income countries will be more
decentralized because higher income families demand more services
and have a greater ability to pay for services.
2. Land Area (in square miles) (A). Countries with greater land areas
tend to be more decentralized, because of the greater difficulty and
cost of governing from the center.
3. Ethnic Diversity (E). Diverse populations tend to demand different
services from government, hence countries with more homogeneous
populations tend to be less decentralized. 15
4. Transition Country dummy variable (1). This is included because
transition countries (mostly those in the former Soviet bloc) are
'different'. The division of expenditure responsibilities between the
public and private sectors is not comparable to that in most
developing and industrialized countries, and sub-national
governments often have significant responsibilities in the area of
social· welfare and for operation of state-owned enterprises. We
expect that, all else held constant, transition countries will show a
greater sub-national government expenditure share than non
transition countries.
The results of the estimation (with all variables expressed in
logarithms) are:
ES= - 3.81 + 0.36Y + 0.27A - 0.0IE + 1.05T
(- 5.35) (6.12) (6.48) (- 0.03) (5.73)
-2

R = 0.50;

(1.1)

N=93

All of the significant independent variables show the expected signs.
We find that there is a significantly larger sub-national government
expenditure share in higher income countries, those with greater land
area, and in transition countries (t-values are shown in parenthesis).
The ethnic diversity variable is not statistically significant. About one
half of the total variation in expenditure shares across the 93 counties
can be explained with this equation.
Based on these results, can we say that South Africa has a level of
sub-national government expenditures that is higher or lower than what
one might expect? We use this equation to predict the level of
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expenditure decentralization for all countries in the sample (Table 1.3).
The predicted expenditure share for South Africa is 19.9 percent, which
is well below the actual share of 48.1 percent. 16 Definitive conclusions
are difficult to draw because of data issues, but this result indicates that
South Africa is considerably more decentralized than might be expected
based on international comparisons. We might conclude that
expenditure decentralization plays a greater role in discretionary
national policy in South Africa than in other, similar countries.
We have used the same equation to compare South Africa with other
African countries for which data are available. The data in Table 1.3
indicate that Nigeria, Uganda, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde,
Morocco, and Maritius also have 'expected' decentralization levels that
are below their actual levels. However, we find that neighboring
Madagascar, Botswana, and Swaziland, as well as Ghana, Senegal,
Benin, Togo, Zambia, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Burkino Faso,
and Mali have lower than expected levels of decentralization.
In order to better understand the revenue side of fiscal
decentralization, we have performed a similar statistical experiment on
sub-national government tax revenues. The dependent variable in this
regression analysis is the percent of total government tax revenues
raised by sub-national governments (TS). The independent variables
and the rationale for their inclusion are analogous to those given above.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) data for this analysis are available
for 60 countries, but only a few of them are in Africa. All data are
averages for the 1992-1997 period.
The regression results, with all variables expressed in logarithms, are
presented in equation 1.2:
TS= -5.75 + 0.39Y + 0.33A - 0.23E + 1.37T
(-4.16) (3.36) (4.74) (-0.72) (4.20)
-2

R = 0.39;

(1.2)

N=60

The sub-national government revenue share is significantly related to
the level of economic development of the country, and to the size of the
country. We cannot explain as much of the international variation as in
the case of the expenditure shares, but the patterns are much the same.
The tax results for South Africa are quite different than the
expenditure results. The level of sub-national government taxation in
South Africa is considerably lower than would be predicted given the

13
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Table 1.3 Fiscal decentralization effort across 22 African countries
for the 1990s
Decentralization
Predicted
effortb
decentralization"

Country

Decentralization

Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
Cote d'Ivoire
Ethiopia
Ghana
Kenya
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Morocco
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa0
Swaziland
Togo
Trinidad and
Tobago
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

2.9
5.9
1.2
15.9
3.2
1.5
4.1
4.0
4.7
1.4
4.8
15.0
28.9
5.5
48.1
1.8
1.7

4.4
15.6
4.9
8.1
7.6
5.2
5.5
6.7
6.0
7.5
3.3
10.3
6.9
6.0
19.9
4.4
3.5

0.7
0.4
0.3
2.0
0.4
0.3
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.2
1.4
1.5
4.2
0.9
2.4
0.4
0.5

4.4
27.2
3.2
10.7

4.7
5.0
7.8
7.8

0.9
5.5
0.4
1.4

Notes:
a. Predicted from equation (1.2).
b. Decentralization divided by predicted decentralization.
c. Data for South Africa are for the period 1994-1999.
Source: Basic data for this analysis are taken from International Monetary Fund
(2001).

income level and size of the country. The actual value of 6 percent is
well under the expected value of 14 percent. This 6 percent tax figure
is also well below the actual expenditure level of 48 percent. This
result reflects the limited revenue powers and significant expenditure
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responsibilities assigned to provincial governments. Though
municipalities do raise most of their own revenues, they are the smallest
sphere of government in the intergovernmental fiscal system.
Overall, these numbers suggest that the South African government is
willing to deliver services through sub-national governments to a
significant extent, but is much less willing to devolve revenue-raising
powers. There are a number of explanations for this: a belief that
control over macro-economic policy requires more central control over
the revenue raising function, a focus on income distribution and a belief
that this is best done through national government fiscal instruments,
and an unwillingness to allow sub-national governments to 'compete'
with the center for the same tax base.
There is an important qualification to these conclusions. The
analysis is based on an international comparison of sub-national
government taxes, which in South Africa includes both the provincial
and local governments. It may well be the case that local governments
are above the internationally expected levels, but this result is hidden
because the provincial governments raise so little revenue.
International comparisons of only local governments are not possible
because of the lack of appropriate data and the wide variation in
expenditure assignment between the middle and bottom tiers.
It is also important to recognize that these data can overstate the
effort of a country toward fiscal decentralization. The expenditure and
revenue shares of sub-national governments probably do not indicate
the true degree of local budgetary discretion. This ratio measures only
the degree to which public services are delivered by sub-national
governments. There may be significant constraints in the form of
centrally determined wages and salaries and other national mandates.
On the revenue side, local discretion may be limited by conditional
grants, and tax rates and bases may be outside the control of sub
national governments. In fact, in South Africa, the provincial
governments, which account for two-thirds of sub-national government
spending, do not have great discretion in determining the level of their
budget and in practice make little use of the taxing powers that have
been given to them. Hence the 49 percent share of sub-national
governments in total government spending probably does overstate the
collective degree of fiscal autonomy of the South African provincial
and local governments.
Despite this overall conclusion, we can argue that the fiscal
autonomy of the local government sphere in South Africa is greater
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than that in many other countries. The municipal governments as a
group have more discretion to determine the size of their budgets than
do the provincial governments, particularly those in the larger urban
areas. The intergovernmental transfers to local governments are not
very significant in size, and are mostly in the form of unconditional
transfers. Local property taxation is relatively unconstrained, and in
fact, South African local governments' use of property tax financing is
high even by comparison with some Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. The RSC levy is
more limited by national government rules in terms of rate and base
determination, but collection is an initiative that is left to the local
governments. We shall return in greater detail to the revenue situation
of South African local governments in subsequent chapters.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
In moving forward with developing the intergovernmental fiscal
system, the South African government must make a number of choices
about the structure and objectives of the local government system. The
most important choice concerns the assignment of municipal functions.
The Constitution and various laws, as noted above, outline basic
responsibilities of municipalities, but considerable elaboration is
needed, particularly to accommodate the post-demarcation transition.
The functions of category A municipalities are relatively clear, although
decisions remain to be made about desired levels and appropriate costs
of basic services. Moreover, the situation will change as new policies,
such as the pending regionalization of electricity distribution and the
devolution of health care services, are implemented in the coming
years. Functional assignment is less clear for category B and C
municipalities, which have widely divergent needs and expenditure
delivery capacities. A Local Government Municipal Structures Act
amendment in late 2000 assigned responsibility for certain municipal
services to the Cs, but it is widely recognized by South African
policymakers that some flexibility in assignment is needed to reflect the
inter-jurisdictional variation in capacity.
The second important choice is how to raise local revenues.
Municipalities have access to a variety of local revenue sources.
Category A and B municipalities use property rates, while category A
and C municipalities have the RSC levy. All municipalities can charge
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for services, and many introduce a general tax element into certain user
charges. Several proposals have been set forth to reform the present
structure. Some of these proposals would involve adjustments to
existing taxes and methods of tax administration. Others would involve
new arrangements. Depending on decisions regarding service
assignments, proposed reforms could include category B municipalities
sharing property rates with category Cs, and/or category C
municipalities sharing RSC levy revenues with category Bs. This
sharing would allow the revenue bases of municipalities to reflect the
functions they are expected to undertake. Given the considerable
service demands placed on municipalities, adoption of selected new
revenue sources, such as motor vehicle taxes, might also be considered.
Finally, the National Treasury is also placing considerable emphasis on
increasing the capital market access of municipalities, at least fiscally
stronger ones, so that they might play a greater role in financing
infrastructure investments.
The third important choice has to do with the design of a transparent
and stable intergovernmental transfer system. As in most countries,
municipal service cost in South Africa often exceeds revenue capacity.
The vertical fiscal gap has not been fully documented in South Africa.
But to the extent a gap exists (see Chapter 6), a decision must be made
about how to close it - by reducing service expectations, raising more
local revenues, or increasing transfers. As noted above, the Constitution
entitles local government to an 'equitable share' of national revenues,
and it also allows for the use of other transfers. The equitable share
formula has been based on the recurrent financing needs for selected
basic services for poor residents of A and B municipalities. Although
this approach has served a useful purpose, the equitable share system
and the formula must evolve as the municipal fiscal system matures and
as there is greater clarity about expenditure and revenue assignments
and capacities. A decision to include the C municipalities in the
equitable share distribution for the 2002-2003 fiscal year was made,
and additional reforms to the intergovernmental grant system are
inevitable. The National Treasury is also working on the consolidation
of a complex and fragmented set of conditional capital transfers.
It is important to emphasize that these basic decisions about the
intergovernmental fiscal system are interrelated. Service assignments
should be based on the capacity of municipal governments, and revenue
assignments should be consistent with expenditure responsibilities.
Intergovernmental transfers should help to overcome the gap between
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municipal expenditure requirements and fiscal capacities, as well as to
meet other national objectives. At the same time, key elements of both
the expenditure and revenue systems need to work in harmony. For
example, recurrent expenditures should be based on the operating
requirements of existing infrastructure facilities, and intergovernmental
transfers should not undermine incentives for municipalities to raise
local revenues or to tap capital markets for investment resources.

Critical Choices that Reflect System Objectives
Embedded in these decisions about expenditure and revenue
assignments and the structure of intergovernmental transfers are a
number of critical choices related to broader system objectives.
Throughout the chapters in this volume, we consider the implications of
alternative policy options for these choices.
There is an important question about the desired degree of
asymmetry in the treatment of municipalities. In a world where
municipal governments have similar needs and capacities, uniform
fiscal treatment is appropriate. In South Africa, however, there are
differences among municipalities in terms of settlement patterns,
service needs, revenue access, and capacities to perform effectively.
Less dense rural jurisdictions, for example, have very different needs
than more urbanized areas. Equally important, some of the legally
empowered Cs have weak capacity, while some of the legally
subsidiary Bs have long been providing services independently of the
Cs. Service delivery also has various dimensions, such as the distinction
between capital investment and service operation, which can in some
cases be managed effectively by different categories of local
government. In addition, it is possible to separate service responsibility
and service provision, where the latter may be done on behalf of
municipalities by private agents or by community groups at the
settlement level. Finally, it is critical to distinguish between desired
service responsibilities and what is currently possible given capacity
constraints. The rules and guidelines for service delivery arrangements
should take into consideration this substantial local government
diversity, the multi-dimensionality of service delivery, and the gap
between the desired system and present realities. This could well lead
to an asymmetrical treatment of local governments in terms of
expenditure assignment.
Another key issue is the extent and form of local autonomy, which
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following chapters consider various dimensions of intergovernmental
fiscal reform in South Africa. 17 In the second chapter, Larry Schroeder
focuses on the current status of local government powers and functions,
and the choices that need to be made to fully rationalize municipal
service assignments. In Chapter 3, Roy Bahl, Paul Smoke, and David
Solomon present an overview of the local government revenue system
in South Africa and some of the reforms being considered. In Chapter
4, Peter Vaz takes a closer look at the structure and effects of the
property tax, as well as proposed reforms to it. Roy Bahl and David
Solomon evaluate in Chapter 5 the Regional Services Council levy and
outline options for restructuring it. In Chapter 6, Andrew Reschovsky
examines the present intergovernmental transfer system and considers
how to further develop it as the expenditure and revenue assignment
picture evolves. Finally, the contributors collectively conclude the
volume with a review in Chapter 7 of options for local government
fiscal reform in South Africa. In this chapter, we focus on
implementation concerns and further highlight the relevance of the
South Africa experience for other developing countries.

NOTES
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

Although each chapter in this volume can stand alone as an individual analysis,
there was substantial coordination and integration of the work, which is based on
a two-year policy research effort in which all of the authors participated. The
basic research was carried out for the South African government under a contract
between USAID and Research Triangle Institute. See the preface for additional
information.
The theory of fiscal federalism is set forth in detail in Oates (1972). More recent
reflections on theory and practice in the developing country setting are provided
in Oates (1999); Bahl and Linn (I 992); Shah (1994); Smoke (1994); Ter
Minassian (1997); Bird and Vaillancourt (1998); Bahl (2000); and Smoke (2001).
A number of recent writings have focused on the importance of implementation.
These include: Bird and Vaillancourt (1998); Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird (1998);
Vaz (1999); Bahl (2000); Smoke (2000); and Smoke (2001).
The history of local government in South Africa is examined in Ministry of
Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development (I 998). Other useful
references include: Manche (1994); Donian (1997); Financial and Fiscal
Commission (1997); and Vaz (1999). A broader perspective on public sector
reform in South Africa is provided in Cameron and Tapscott (2000).
For a good discussion of the early development of metropolitan local
governments, see Ahmad (1996).
These structures are detailed in Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional
Development (1998).
In the language of the Constitution, all sub-provincial governments are referred to
as 'municipalities'.

I,

I

,!
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8.

Since demarcation, an additional ten district councils were added (including
'cross-border' DCs), bringing the total number to 57.
The information and data used here come from: Department of Constitutional
Development (1997a); Department of Constitutional Development (1997b); Vaz
(1999); and National Treasury (200 I).
For example, the Local Government Transition Act (Second Amendment) assigns
local governments the responsibility for integrated development planning.
Sections 229 and 230 of Chapter 13 of the Constitution (1996).
Section 227 of Chapter 13 of the Constitution (1996).
National Treasury (2001).
The provincial and local government share of total government expenditure
reported for South Africa by the IMF (200 I) is lower than that reported by the
government (National Treasury, 2001, 2001a). The differences appear to be due
primarily to the classification of local level expenditures, as is indicated by the
following comparisons (in million rand) for fiscal year 1998-1999:

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Iii
,[

I,I
II
II

15.

IMF

Government

Central
Provincial
Local

133,788
95,368
25,915

117,074
97,275
54,800

Total

255,071

269,149

Under the IMF definition, the sub-national government expenditure share was
47.5 percent in 1999. Under the government definition, it was 56.5 percent in
1999.
The commonly used Ethnic fractionalization index is a probability that two
randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnic groups:

Fractionalization = 1-

16.

17.

t(-�J

M = number of ethnic groups, N = total population, n; = number of people who
belong to ith ethnic group. So, in our regression model, heterogeneity is measured
as a probability that two randomly selected individuals will not belong to same
ethnic group. In other words, it is analogous to one minus the Herfindahl index of
concentration.
There are different views about how to measure the level of fiscal decentralization
in South Africa. We have chosen to include debt service as a national government
expenditure, and to include all intergovernmental transfers as sub-national
government expenditures. Some analysts have made different choices about what
to include, resulting in different distributions of expenditure shares between levels
of government. (See also endnote 14.) The expenditure share measure reported
here for South Africa is an average for the post-Constitution years 1994-1999.
Note that this work was conducted before, during and after the municipal
demarcation that reduced the total number of local governments in 2000. Thus
some portions of the field research and data analysis were conducted in the 'old'
municipalities, while others were conducted in the 'new' municipalities. Where
possible and relevant, we tried to convert the data based on the old municipal
boundaries to data based on the new boundaries.
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